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DISTINGUISHING FICTION FROM REALITY:  
THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL AUTO 
INDUSTRY 
 
Terence J. Lau* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) is a 
collection of ten countries with a combined population of over 500 million.1  
Combined gross domestic product (“GDP”) of all ASEAN countries exceeds 
$737 billion.2  ASEAN countries are important trading partners with the 
United States.  In 2004, fifteen countries accounted for more than seventy-
five percent of all foreign trade with the United States.3  Within these fifteen 
countries, two are from ASEAN—Malaysia, ranked tenth, and Singapore, 
ranked fifteenth.4  The countries are diverse, ranging from a country that 
witnessed per capita GDP growth from $427 a year in 1960 to $25,352 in 
2004 (Singapore)5 to the world’s most populous Muslim country 
(Indonesia).6  GDP growth in the region averaged 5.4 percent in 2005, and is 
expected to reach 5.8 percent in 2006.7  Political systems run the gamut 
from military dictatorship (Myanmar)8 to “soft authoritarianism”9 
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1 ASEAN Secretariat, Overview Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Establishment and 
Membership,” http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed Feb. 24, 2006). 
2 Id. 
3 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Top Trading Partners—Total Trade, Exports, Imports, 
Year-to-Date December 2004, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0412.html 
(last modified Feb. 10, 2005).  
4 Id. 
5 Singapore Dept. of Statistics, Per Capita GDP at Current Market Prices,  
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/ keystats/hist/gdp.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2006). 
6 See President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Speech, Revisiting our Foreign Policy (Indonesian Council 
on World Affairs, May 19, 2005), in The Jakarta Post 7 (May 25, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News 
library; The Jakarta Post file).  Indonesia’s population, at over 241 million, is behind only the United 
States, India, and China.  CIA World Factbook, Rank Order—Population,  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (last  updated Jan. 10, 2006). 
7 Krissana Parnsoonthorn, Europeans Urged to Keep ASEAN On Map: Thanong Confident in Economic 
Reforms, Bangkok Post (Sept. 23, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; Global News Wire file).  
8 The United States State Department describes the Burmese government as ruling with a “pervasive 
security apparatus” and with an “extremely poor” human rights record.  U.S Dept. of State, Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Burma Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Burma—
2004, http://www.state.gov/g/ drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41637.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
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(Singapore and Malaysia) to liberal democracy (Thailand).10  Economically, 
the picture is equally scattered.  While virtually all member countries claim 
to embrace capitalism (Laos remains officially communist even in its 
economic system),11 member state economies range from the highly 
capitalistic with a tradition of governmental non-interference and 
transparency (Singapore)12 to a highly controlled, high import quota and 
tariff and non-tradable currency regime (Myanmar).13  ASEAN countries, 
while geographically close to each other, seem to share little in common 
with each other.  In spite of this, ASEAN sought to undertake economic 
integration in 1976,14 and the results have been mixed.15 
This Article explores the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (“AFTA”) 
and its implications for the regional and global auto industry.  Section I of 
this article provides a brief history of ASEAN and its attempts to integrate 
regionally.  It outlines the reasons for regional economic integration, and 
traces the current literature in this area.  Section II provides an overview of 
the current auto industry in each of the major auto-producing countries in 
ASEAN: Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia.  It will 
also explain Malaysia’s protected auto industry and Malaysia’s attempts to 
delay implementation of AFTA, and its neighboring countries’ reactions.  
Section III will describe the very first exchange of completely built-up 
vehicles (“CBU”) within ASEAN under the precursor to AFTA, the ASEAN 
Industrial Cooperation Scheme (“AICO”), and its implications for the future 
of ASEAN.  Section IV will expand on the concept of economic integration 
by describing current efforts by the auto industry to integrate, thus reducing 
its costs, increasing quality, and increasing consumer choices.  Finally, 
Section V of this Article will draw some conclusions about the lessons 
learned from the auto industry’s experience with AFTA, and will suggest 
that further economic integration will provide ASEAN with a credible and 
stable path to future growth even as the ascendant China continues to draw 
foreign direct investment from the region. 
                                                                                                                  
9 Randall Peerenboom, Show Me the Money: The Dominance of Wealth in Determining Rights 
Performance in Asia, 15 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 75, 76 (2004). 
10 D.C. Kennedy, In Search of a Balance Between Police Power and Privacy in the Cybercrime Treaty, 9 
Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1 (Fall 2002). 
11 U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Laos,  
http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ei/bgn/2770.htm (accessed Mar.14, 2006). 
12 Singapore’s corruption-free government and friendly investment policies have resulted in growth rates 
that averaged eight percent between 1960 and 1999.  U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Singapore, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm (accessed Mar. 
14, 2006) [hereinafter Background Note: Singapore]. 
13 Myanmar (also known as Burma) has suffered from economic mismanagement that has caused a 
downward economic spiral for most Burmese citizens.  U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Burma, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm (accessed Mar. 
14, 2006) [hereinafter Background Note: Burma]. 
14 Deborah A. Haas, Student Author, Out of Others’ Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional 
Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 Am. U.J. Intl. L. & Policy 809, 813 (Spring 1994). 
15 See generally George O. White, III, Student Author, From Snowplows to Siopao—Trying to Compete 
in a Global Marketplace: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 8 Tulsa J. Comp. & Intl. L. 177 (2000).  See also 
Haas, supra n. 14, at 810 (noting that ASEAN “lack[s] a strong record in economic achievement”). 
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II. ASEAN AND ATTEMPTS AT REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
A. Post-War Southeast Asia: ASEAN Forms 
In order to understand AFTA, one must examine the historical 
context which gave rise to ASEAN.  Prior to the Second World War, most 
Southeast Asian nations were colonies of European powers.16  Japan’s war 
effort had driven up its appetite for raw materials, and Southeast Asia 
provided a key source for those materials.17  On December 7, 1941, in 
addition to bombing Pearl Harbor, the Japanese also launched military 
operations against Malaysia (then Malaya), the Philippines, and Hong 
Kong.18  On January 2, 1942, Japanese troops captured Manila.19  Kuala 
Lumpur fell on January 11, and Singapore followed on February 15.20  
Burma and portions of the Netherlands East Indies quickly followed suit.21 
Just as quickly as the Japanese established occupation in Southeast 
Asia, Japan began losing ground once the United States joined the war.22  
After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Japanese surrender in 1945, 
many countries in Southeast Asia sought independence from their former 
colonial masters.  Indonesia, for example, declared independence from the 
Netherlands in 1945, and settled hostilities with the Dutch in 1949.23  Burma 
was granted independence from Great Britain in 1948.24  The Philippines 
gained its independence from the United States in 1946, a process that 
started in 1935 but was interrupted by Japanese occupation.25  Malaysia won 
independence from Great Britain in 1957.26  Singapore joined the British 
Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah to form the Federation of Malaya in 
1963.27  Indonesia objected to this move and severed trade with Malaysia.28  
After some friction and negotiations with the central government in Kuala 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
16 Nicholas Tarling, The Establishment of the Colonial Regimes, in The Cambridge History of Southeast 
Asia, Volume Two: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 5, 5-72 (Nicholas Tarling ed., Cambridge U. 
Press 1992). 
17 A.J. Stockwell, Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of European Colonial Empires, in The 
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume Two: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 329, 330 
(Nicholas Tarling ed., Cambridge U. Press 1992). 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 331. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 332. 
23 U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Indonesia,  
http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
24 Background Note: Burma, supra n. 13. 
25 U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Philippines,  
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
26 U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Malaysia,  
http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/ei/bgn/2777.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
27 Background Note: Singapore, supra n. 12. 
28 For an excellent accounting of this phase of Southeast Asia’s development, see Matthew Jones, 
Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia 1961—1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia, and 
the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge U. Press 2002). 
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Lumpur, Singapore itself seceded from Malaysia in 1965.29 
Amidst this background, ASEAN was formed in 1967 with the 
signing of the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok.30  Original member states 
included Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore.31  The 
short document set forth ASEAN’s goals as accelerating economic growth, 
promoting regional security and stability, and expanding trade.32  To carry 
out these goals, the Bangkok Declaration created an annual meeting of 
Foreign Ministers and a standing committee to carry on the work of 
ASEAN.33  In spite of its stated goals, ASEAN’s unspoken objective was to 
create stability in the midst of growing communist insurgencies in Vietnam 
and Cambodia.34  All parties involved knew that economic progress would 
be slow.35 
B. Economic Integration & ASEAN Enlargement 
In 1976, ASEAN members for the first time “created practical 
programs affecting trade and security.”36  At the ministerial meeting in Bali, 
Indonesia that year, the member states signed the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which established a loose framework for 
economic cooperation and development.37  It also enshrined the ASEAN 
principle of “[n]on-interference” in the “internal affairs” of other member 
states.38  The Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed at the same meeting, 
stated that the five member states would cooperate in “trade in order to 
promote development and growth of new production and trade.”39  These 
documents initiated the first experiments with regional integration within 
ASEAN, producing various industrial projects, industrial complementation 
schemes, and the beginnings of preferential trading rights such as lowered 
tariffs.40  None of these initiatives were very successful in creating a 
cohesive regional trading bloc.41  Instead, the five member countries started 
industrializing their own economies and looked beyond each other to 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
29 Background Note: Singapore, supra n. 12.  
30 ASEAN Secretariat, supra n. 1. 
31 Id. 
32 The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Thailand, 8 August 1967,  
http://www.aseansec.org/3628.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006)). 
33 Id. 
34 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 329 (HarperCollins 
2000). 
35 Id. at 330. 
36 Haas, supra n. 14, at 813. 
37 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976 art. 4-6,  
http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
38 Id. at art. 2. 
39 Declaration of ASEAN Concord Indonesia, 24 February 1976 § B(3)(ii),  
http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
40 Haas, supra n. 14, at 816-18. 
41 Id. 
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establish major trading partners.42 
In 1984, Brunei joined ASEAN after gaining independence from 
Great Britain.43  The tiny nation of 350,000 people depends largely on oil 
and gas to sustain its economy, and has had very little impact on ASEAN or 
efforts to integrate regionally.44 
By the mid-eighties, ASEAN countries were enjoying a period of 
relative peace and prosperity.  Together with policies that attracted foreign 
direct investment, most ASEAN countries were enjoying annual growth 
rates in excess of six to eight percent.45  Singapore, which had the most 
liberalized economy and had developed the most economically, had been 
pushing for some time for an ASEAN-wide regional free trade area, but 
these efforts had been rebuffed due to suspicion from the other major 
members.46  By the late-eighties, however, China and India had begun 
liberalizing their economies, and foreign direct investment was diverting to 
those large markets.47  Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew worked 
with Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to propose the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area.48 
In 1992, during a summit meeting, ASEAN members agreed to 
regional trade integration and passed three important trade documents.49  
The first was the Singapore Declaration of 1992, which calls for ASEAN 
members to “move [to] a higher plane of political and economic 
cooperation” and for the establishment of AFTA with the ultimate goal 
being tariffs of zero to five percent by 2008.50  The Framework Agreement 
on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (Framework Agreement) 
declares that the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (“CEPT”) scheme 
would be the main mechanism for establishing AFTA.51  In a nod to the 
ASEAN culture of non-interference in domestic matters, the Framework 
Agreement specifically states that while all ASEAN member states would 
participate in ASEAN “economic arrangements, two or more Member States 
may proceed first if other Member States are not ready” to liberalize.52  The 
dispute resolution clause of the Framework Agreement is startlingly short 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
42 Id. at 817. 
43 U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Brunei,  
http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ei/bgn/2700.htm (accessed Mar. 8, 2006). 
44 Id. 
45 Lee, supra n. 34, at 340. 
46 Id. at 341. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Jack I. Garvey, AFTA after NAFTA: Regional Trade Blocs and the Propagation of Environmental and 
Labor Standards, 15 Berkeley J. Intl. L. 245, 267 (1997). 
50 Singapore Declaration of 1992 § 2, http://www.aseansec.org/5120.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
51 Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation Singapore, 28 January 1992 art. 
II(A)(2), http://www.aseansec.org/5125.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
52 Id. at art. I(3). 
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and equally conciliatory.  It states that any differences between ASEAN 
members shall “be settled amicably between the parties” and when 
necessary, an “appropriate body” may be designated to settle the dispute.53  
Finally, the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (“CEPT Agreement”) provides for 
the legal framework of tariff reduction for eligible ASEAN-produced 
goods.54  The CEPT Agreement applies to all ASEAN member states and all 
manufactured goods.55  Originally, Tariffs were to be reduced to between 
zero to five percent by 2008.56  Quantitative restrictions and non-tariff 
barriers were similarly slated for elimination.57  However, this time frame 
was later accelerated to 2003.58 
Although the CEPT Agreement was the most significant step 
ASEAN had taken to integrate its member economies, it was an agreement 
that was riddled with significant escapes for economies concerned about the 
pain that often accompanies economic liberalization.  The rules of origin, for 
example, called for preferential tariffs to be applied to any product “if at 
least 40% of its content originates from any Member State.”59  This 
requirement was recently modified to permit twenty percent ASEAN 
content for purposes of “cumulation.”60  Another provision of the CEPT 
Agreement, and one later invoked by Malaysia to protect its domestic auto 
industry,61 allowed for an importing country to suspend preferential tariffs 
“for such time as may be necessary” when import of a particular product 
threatens to cause “serious injury” to sectors producing like or competitive 
products in the importing country.62 
Under the CEPT Agreement, ASEAN member states categorized 
their tariff lines into four general categories.  The General Exception List is 
to be used only to permanently exclude products for the “protection of 
national security, public morals, human, animal or plant life, and articles of 
artistic, historic and archeological value.”63  The Sensitive List is to be used 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
53 Id. at art. IX. 
54 Agreement On The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area Singapore, 28 January 1992, http://www.aseansec.org/5124.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
55 Id. at art. II. 
56 Id. at art. IV. 
57 Id. at art. V(A). 
58 Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation art. 1,  
http://www.aseansec.org/12369.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). 
59 CEPT Agreement, supra n. 54, at art. II(4). 
60 Implementing Guidelines for Partial Cumulation Under ASEAN Cumulative Rules of Origin  
http://www.aseansec.org/17297.pdf (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).  These new guidelines have resulted in a 
boost in export value from countries such as Thailand.  Petchanet Pratruangkrai, AFTA Trade: Exports 
Boosted by Duty Privileges, The Nation (Sept. 8, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; The Nation 
file). 
61 See infra  § III(E). 
62 CEPT Agreement, supra n. 54, at art. VI. 
63 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): An Update,  
http://www.aseansec.org/10342.htm (accessed Mar. 8, 2006). 
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for unprocessed agricultural products, which are indeed sensitive items for 
most ASEAN countries.64  Items on the Sensitive List are given a longer 
time frame for liberalization into AFTA.65  The Temporary Exclusion List is 
for tariff lines that a government wishes to temporarily shield from trade 
liberalization.66  Finally, once an item falls into the Inclusion List, the 
member state must grant zero to five percent duty privileges for that item.67 
In late 2004, ASEAN announced another acceleration of 
liberalization, when the six more developed members of Brunei, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand announced the abolition 
of tariffs in the autos, textiles, and electronics sectors by 2007.68  Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam were given until 2012 to follow.69  ASEAN 
has also announced plans to create an ASEAN Economic Community by 
2020.70  Components of this Economic Community include AFTA and an 
ASEAN Single Window (a customs initiative to facilitate trade).71  In 2005, 
the inaugural East Asia Summit took place, with the goal of creating an East 
Asia Free Trade Area.72 
C. Current Literature 
Prior literature on AFTA and its role in strengthening ASEAN, 
predictably, has focused on AFTA’s genesis.  In 1993, shortly after the 
Singapore meeting that established AFTA, Kenevan and Winden described 
the key AFTA documents in some detail.73  Even in that early stage of 
development, Kenevan and Winden warned that excessive exceptions, 
unclear definitions, weak dispute resolution mechanisms, and a poorly 
defined monitoring institution were all key weaknesses in the AFTA 
founding documents.74  Soon thereafter, Haas demonstrated that AFTA was 
a response to the growing influence of other trading arrangements, 
particularly the European Union and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”),75 and recommended ASEAN “actively strive to 
implement a successful economic framework and a harmonized legal 
institution.”76  The role that ASEAN might play in a much bigger Asia-
_______________________________________________________ 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Amit Chanda, ASEAN Accelerates Pace of Progress Towards Free Trading Regime, World Markets 
Analysis (Nov. 29, 2004) (available in LEXIS, News library; World Markets Analysis file). 
69 Id. 
70 Mohd Arshi Daud, Summit to Gauge ASEAN’s Attractiveness as Single Economic Entity, Malaysia 
Economic News (Dec. 7, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; Malaysia Economic News file). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Peter Kenevan & Andrew Winden, Recent Development: Flexible Free Trade: The ASEAN Free Trade 
Area, 34 Harv. Intl. L.J. 224 (1993). 
74 Id. at 235. 
75 Haas, supra n. 14, at 821. 
76 Id. at 867. 
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Pacific economic grouping was explored by Dichter.77  Dichter suggests that 
the development of a large Asia-Pacific economic grouping, founded on 
international trade law, would be more effective to removing barriers to free 
trade and could “evolve” to provide a forum to resolve non-trade 
transnational issues.78  Kiriyama combined “theoretical prediction” with 
empirical analysis79 to suggest that AFTA may be flawed because it only 
addresses tariff reductions, and true integration requires much more.80  Other 
commentators have been critical of AFTA’s lack of a robust and transparent 
dispute resolution mechanism81 and suggested that linking trade concessions 
to environmental and labor standards might produce a more robust free trade 
area.82  Most recently, White has reiterated the argument that AFTA has 
tremendous promise as a regional trading area and predicted that AFTA will 
prove successful in the long run.83  Bello, however, has stated that, “We had 
30 years to build an ASEAN house, and we blew it.”84  He argues that in its 
first two decades of existence, ASEAN was hijacked by politics.85  In 
essence, he blames AFTA’s lack of success on three factors: a lack of a 
common vision on a free trade area, a lack of relevance to industry, and a 
lack of effort to make ASEAN a democratic effort involving the people of 
ASEAN.86 
Thus far, no literature has addressed the success or failure of AFTA 
in relation to any specific industry, or the consequences of Malaysia’s 
invocation of the AFTA mechanisms for delay of sensitive products or 
sectors.  Current literature is also silent on what the future holds for AFTA, 
especially in light of a proposed ASEAN-China Free Trade area and the 
continued march towards bilateral trading agreements by ASEAN’s more 
economically advanced countries.  This Article seeks to fill those gaps. 
III. OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL AUTO INDUSTRIES 
Within the ten member countries of ASEAN, five (Thailand, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia) have some level of domestic 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
77 Harold Dichter, Legal Implications of an Asia-Pacific Economic Grouping, 16 U. Pa. J. Intl. Bus. L. 99 
(1995). 
78 Id. at 153. 
79 Nobuo Kiriyama, Institutional Evolution in Economic Integration: A Contribution to Comparative 
Institutional Analysis for International Economic Organization, 19 U. Pa. J. Intl. Econ. L. 53, 96 (1998). 
80 Id. at 97-99. 
81 Jeffrey A. Kaplan, ASEAN’s Rubicon: A Dispute Resolution Mechanism for AFTA, 14 UCLA P. Basin 
L.J. 147, 189 (1996). 
82 Garvey, supra n. 49, at 274. 
83 White, supra n. 15, at 199. 
84 Walden Bello, Is ASEAN Irrelevant?, BusinessWorld (Philippines) (Dec. 14, 2004) (available in WL, 
BUSWLDMAN database). 
85 Id. 
86 Id.; see also Walden Bello, Can the Philippines “Handle” Globalization?, BusinessWorld 
(Philippines) (Jan. 25, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; BusinessWorld file) (indicating a major 
problem with ASEAN was indecision on whether to be a stepping stone for global trade or to create a 
regional bloc with high tariff walls surrounding the member countries). 
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auto manufacturing and foreign direct investment by global auto 
manufacturers.  Not surprisingly, these five countries also represent the 
largest auto markets in the region in terms of vehicle sales.  A sixth, 
Singapore, has no domestic manufacturing base but vehicle sales are still 
running ahead of Vietnam and therefore remain an important market for 
manufacturers.  Within the countries, there exists a wide range in the level 
of sophistication in the respective auto industries.  Thailand (with its export-
oriented strategy attracting large amounts of foreign direct investment) and 
Malaysia (where a large domestic market has allowed a domestic 
manufacturer to thrive) represent the most advanced types of manufacturing 
in the region, with large-scale vehicle production and research and 
development.87  The auto industries in Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam 
are smaller and thus largely limited to assembly of completely knocked-
down (“CKD”) kits, sourced from other countries.  The industries that 
emerged in these countries began as governments attempted to force 
industrialization through import substitution policies.88 
It is not surprising that the world’s major automakers are attracted to 
ASEAN.  The region attracted more than $20 billion in foreign direct 
investment in 2003, a forty-eight percent increase over the previous year.89  
The foreign direct investment stock (total amount of foreign direct 
investment) in ASEAN is up over eighty-five percent since 1995.90  Over 
1.7 million vehicles were sold in the region in 2004, and that number is 
forecasted to increase to 2.4 million by 2010.91  AFTA’s promise of lowered 
trade barriers is attractive to all carmakers, from South Korea-based 
Hyundai-Kia92 to niche luxury producers such as Audi, which announced 
plans to build a plant somewhere in Southeast Asia in 2004.93  Indian 
automaker Tata, with an eye towards expansion to the rest of Southeast 
Asia, is exploring assembling pickups in Thailand.94  Since the 
implementation of AFTA tariff rates in 2003, intra-ASEAN trade in auto 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
87 See e.g. Ready for AFTA and Regional Competition, New Straits Times 16 (Mar. 27, 2005) (available 
in LEXIS, News library; New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) file). 
88 Expert Discusses Effects of FTAs on Automotive Industry in Asia, Thai Press Reports (May 6, 2005) 
(available in LEXIS, News library; Global News Wire file). 
89 Audrina Gan, Case Stories: Southeast Asia Back on Track, The Edge Singapore (Sept. 27, 2004) 
(available in LEXIS, News library, the Edge Singapore file). 
90 Id. 
91 Ford Motor Company Economist Conferences, Speech, South East Asia: If Only There Was Co-
operation? (India, Dec. 7, 2005) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Economist Conferences].  
92 Johanna Iivonen, Hyundai-Kia Mulling ASEAN Production Operations, World Markets Analysis (Jan. 
17, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; World Markets Analysis file); Hyundai Indonesia Upbeat 
Over This Year’s 13,500 Cars Target, The Jakarta Post (Feb. 14, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News 
Library; Global News Wire file). 
93 Lee Peart, Audi Mulls New Car Plant in Southeast Asia, World Markets Analysis (Aug. 10, 2004) 
(available in LEXIS, News library; World Markets Analysis file). 
94 Lee Peart, Tata to Assemble Pick-Ups in Thailand, World Markets Analysis (Apr. 1, 2005) (available 
in LEXIS, News library; World Markets Analysis file). 
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products and services increased fifty-five percent from 2002 to 2003.95  This 
section will focus on the five primary manufacturing countries within 
ASEAN and explain their various commitments to regional integration. 
A. Thailand 
In 2003, Thailand’s economy grew at the second-fastest rate in 
ASEAN, posting 6.7 percent GDP growth.96  On the eastern seaboard of 
Thailand, close to the deep-sea port of Rayong lies the Eastern Seaboard 
Industrial Estate (“Estate”).  As one drives into the Estate, a signboard 
proclaiming the Estate as the Detroit of the East greets visitors.  Here, 
General Motors, Ford, BMW, and Toyota have established manufacturing 
operations to serve both the burgeoning Thai domestic market as well as 
exports to countries all around the world.  No discussion of Thailand’s auto 
industry would therefore be complete without a discussion of both domestic 
and export markets. 
Domestically, Thailand’s auto industry grew eighteen percent from 
2003 to 2004.97  The industry is the largest in ASEAN, with over 625,000 
units sold locally in 2004.98  The industry is predicted to rise to 890,000 by 
2010.99  Domestic taxes come in the form of excise tax, interior tax, and 
value added tax, which run from zero to fifty percent.100  These taxes distort 
the market to favor pickups and pickup-based sport utility vehicles 
(“SUV”).101 
Thailand already ranks as the world’s second largest producer of 
pickup trucks, behind the United States.102  In 2005, the industry produced 
over 1 million cars, and in 2006 Thailand will export nearly fifteen percent 
of its production.103  The government’s stated goal is to increase that ration 
to fifty percent in the next five years.104 
Not surprisingly, having the strongest and largest auto industry in 
the region has meant that the Thai government has embraced AFTA.  
Thailand implemented the five percent AFTA tariff rate for automobiles and 
parts in 2003.105  In 2003, Thailand’s intra-ASEAN trade in auto products 
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increased ninty-six percent from the prior year.106 
The use of Thailand as an export hub is proof positive of decades of 
careful government encouragement to establish an industry.  In the first five 
months of 2005, vehicle exports grew forty-seven percent from the year 
prior.107  Toyota, Mitsubishi, and the Ford/Mazda joint venture, Auto 
Alliance Thailand, lead as the top three exporters.  Even heavy truck 
manufacturers such as Mitsubishi’s Fuso truck division use Thailand as an 
export hub to the rest of ASEAN.108  Since 2004, Thailand is in line to 
receive new auto industry investments totaling $2.2 billion.109 
Thailand’s auto industry remains the strongest and most capable 
within the region.  Aggressive foreign direct investment by both United 
States and Japanese manufacturers has created an industry capable of 
advanced vehicle manufacturing with quality suitable for exports.  Local 
parts suppliers have strong capabilities and therefore local content in Thai-
produced vehicles is high, further driving the benefits of an open and liberal 
auto policy in the Kingdom. 
B. Philippines 
The historical impact of American influence on the Philippine 
culture is reflected within the domestic auto market.  It is ASEAN’s only 
left-hand drive market, and the industry is uniquely characterized by the 
Jeepney, a home-made vehicle that serves both large families and functions 
as the unofficial answer to a sprawling country’s need for mass public 
transportation.  As there are no official statistics tracking the Jeepney 
manufacturing industry, this portion of this Article will deal only with the 
official auto industry. 
The domestic industry in the Philippines continues to suffer the 
effects of the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis, even while other industries in the 
region have recovered to their pre-crisis levels.110  From 2003-2004, the 
industry shrank to 88,400 units, the only industry to actually shrink in 
ASEAN.111  The industry is forecast to increase to merely 119,000 by 
2010.112  Vehicles in the Philippines are subject to excise and value added 
taxes in the range of two to sixty percent.113 
The number of vehicles sold in the Philippines is too small to 
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sustain domestic manufacturing in a liberalized AFTA environment, and 
therefore an export strategy is key to the survival of auto assembly plants in 
the Philippines.  Implementing AFTA on time in 2003 with a five percent 
tariff rate has assisted the Philippines in establishing an export strategy.114  
In 2003, the first year of full AFTA implementation, the Philippines’ level 
of intra-ASEAN trade in auto products increased sixty-eight percent from 
the prior year.115 
Philippines’ auto industry is characterized by a weak domestic 
market that, alone among its peers, has yet to fully recover from the effects 
of the Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998.  This weak domestic demand has 
forced many manufacturers and suppliers to trim back their plans for the 
Philippines.  In spite of this, low World Trade Organization (WTO) tariffs 
on components and vehicle CKD kits have attracted some major automakers 
to the country.  Some levels of exports have started, and the industry 
remains poised for recovery.  Weak political institutions and a long-term 
lack of cohesion among government leaders, however, continue to threaten 
long term stability and investor confidence. 
C.  Indonesia 
Indonesia, like its regional counterparts, has been cultivating a local 
auto industry for over thirty years.  Political turmoil and economic upheaval, 
however, have robbed Indonesia of the similar success that Thailand has 
enjoyed.  An ill-fated attempt to create a national car along the likes of 
Malaysia’s Proton failed when the Japanese and American governments 
protested to the WTO.116  While vehicle assembly is making a nice recovery 
in Indonesia, supplier capability for complex parts remains a problem.117  
The local market is dominated by van and utility multipurpose vehicles, and 
thus far automakers that have announced AFTA export intentions for 
Indonesia have focused their efforts on that class of products.118  Japanese 
manufacturers have managed their investments well and look poised to take 
advantage of regional economic integration in Indonesia.  Vehicle sales in 
2005 were thirty percent higher than in 2004.119  The domestic market is 
expected to top 500,000 in 2005, and reach 750,000 by 2009.120  
Domestically sold vehicles are subject to a luxury tax of up to seventy-five 
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percent.121 
D. Vietnam 
Among ASEAN member economies, Vietnam’s has been the fastest 
growing for a number of years, posting 7.3 percent GDP growth in 2003 and 
an estimated 7.2 percent in 2004.122  The auto industry is regulated by the 
granting of licenses by the government.  Thus far, there are fourteen vehicle 
manufacturing joint ventures, eleven operational and three more 
underway.123  In the first half of 2005, the domestic market reached 16,000 
units, an increase of twenty-six percent from the prior year.124  For the full 
year, Vietnam is expected to record sales of 41,700 units.125  The industry is 
expected to reach 54,000 by 2010.126  Despite the low volumes, vehicle 
prices in Vietnam are among the highest in the world.127  Vehicles sold in 
Vietnam are subject to a Special Consumption Tax of up to sixty percent 
along with a ten percent value added tax.128  In 2005, the latest entry into the 
market, Vinaxuki, commenced operations.129 
AFTA integration remains a problem for Vietnam.  Vietnam 
requested, and received, a two-year delay on reducing the import of auto 
parts from Thailand to 2008.130  In return, Vietnam agreed to reduce tariffs 
on other lines, including livestock and electrical products.131  The 
government remains committed to reducing tariffs on CBU vehicles under 
AFTA, starting with a reduction to twenty percent in 2008.132  Shortfalls in 
customs revenue, however, will likely be offset by increases in internal taxes 
such as the Special Consumption Tax, currently set at forty percent.133 
E. Malaysia 
Malaysia is a critical auto market in ASEAN.  Total vehicle sales in 
the first eight months of 2004 rose fourteen percent to over 312,000 units.134  
This places Malaysia as the second-largest market in ASEAN, and the 
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largest for passenger cars.  In 2005, the industry is expected to sell 520,000 
units.135  By 2010, the industry is expected to rise to 639,000 units.136  If 
Malaysia fully implemented AFTA, a host of car companies would be 
interested in expansion plans there.137  Unfortunately, other considerations 
have meant that those plans are still collecting dust on a bookshelf. 
Malaysia’s domestic auto industry is dominated by Proton, a 
national carmaker owned by the government.  Protectionist government 
measures have meant that Proton traditionally enjoyed market share in 
excess of sixty percent.138  This share dropped to forty-five percent in 2004, 
as aggressive price-cutting by Japanese and Korean automakers enabled 
more Malaysians to purchase non-Proton vehicles.  In 2005, the company’s 
goal was to increase market share back to fifty percent,139 but analysts 
predicted a further decline in market share to below thirty-five percent.140  
When Proton’s management141 and dealer network142 complained that the 
government was not doing enough to protect it from foreign competition, 
outspoken Minister of International Trade and Industry Datuk Seri Rafidah 
Aziz said that the government had always taken steps to protect Proton’s 
interest since it began.143  Aziz also freely admits that whenever Malaysia 
was forced to reduce tariffs, it engaged in price “simulation” in the market 
so that there was a sizeable difference between the price of imported and 
Proton-manufactured vehicles.144 
Proton’s success in an open, liberalized trading environment hinges 
on its ability to become globally competitive.145  Tariff and non-tariff 
measures may protect its market share, but without access to critical new 
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technologies and larger markets for economies of scale,146 it risks being 
inundated should Malaysia liberalize.147  One solution would be to find a 
partner in a global automaker.  Throughout 2003 and 2004, the government 
made no secret of its plans to locate a partner for Proton.148  Germany’s 
Volkswagen (VW) emerged as an early suitor, and the possibility of a tie-up 
was greeted with cheer from investors.149  VW would provide technology, 
products, capital, and a distribution network outside Malaysia for Proton 
products.150  In return, VW would obtain a foothold in the largest passenger 
car market in ASEAN.151  Proton, which has excess capacity in its plants, 
could assemble VW models for distribution in the region.152  By mid-2005, 
discussions between Proton and VW were at a standstill.153  In early 2006, 
discussions between the two companies collapsed amidst reports that 
Proton’s management refused to cede management control to VW.154  
Proton’s share price dropped more than ten percent on the news.155 
A second carmaker, Perodua, has close ties to Toyota.  In 2004, 
Toyota’s Indonesian subsidiary began shipping CKD kits of its Avanza 
multi-utility vehicle for final assembly by Perodua in Malaysia.156  Perodua, 
which is twenty-five percent owned by Toyota’s Daihatsu division, has also 
invested heavily in expanding production capacity in anticipation of AFTA 
compliance.157  Analysts agree that Perodua is in much better shape to face 
AFTA than Proton.158 
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In 2000, Malaysia sought to delay transferring auto tariff lines to the 
Inclusion List under CEPT.159  In typical collaborative ASEAN fashion, the 
member states passed the Protocol Regarding the Implementation of the 
CEPT Scheme Temporary Exclusion List, which permitted member 
countries to delay implementing AFTA for any product whose transfer into 
AFTA “would cause or have caused real problems.”160  Malaysia promptly 
invoked the Protocol to delay transferring over 218 auto-related items into 
its Inclusion List.161  Instead of the five percent rate by 2006 as mandated by 
AFTA, Malaysia sought to delay implementing a twenty percent rate until 
2005.162  Assuming a five percent annual step-down, Malaysia would not 
reach a five percent tariff rate until 2008.163  Details of how Malaysia would 
implement the delay were scarce, and even by late 2004, the government 
had yet to announce how it would liberalize the auto industry.164  Industry 
executives were left with no choice but to adopt a wait-and-see approach on 
how to include Malaysia in their regional integration plans.165 
Efforts by Malaysia to delay implementation of AFTA brought an 
angry response from its neighbors, especially Thailand166 and Indonesia.167  
By the end of 2004, however, as Malaysia appeared ready to lower tariff 
rates to twenty percent, Thailand was seeking ways to lower the rhetoric 
with Malaysia.168 
In 2005, Malaysia carried out its promise to lower the tariff rate for 
CBU vehicles to twenty percent.169  The import duty on some classes of 
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vehicles went from 190 percent to twenty percent under AFTA.170  The 
long-awaited emergence of the Malaysian Automotive Policy (“MAP”), 
however, continued to be elusive.171  The government continued to insist on 
protectionist measures by simultaneously increasing the excise tax on 
imported vehicles.172  In some classes of vehicles, excise duty went from 
100 percent to 250 percent.173  Proton, however, retained a pricing and profit 
advantage because of an excise tax rebate.174  The most controversial 
measure was to retain the approval process for importing vehicles, a process 
that allocated the permits to local bumiputeras (persons of Malay 
ethnicity).175  The requirement for an approval permit in order to import 
vehicles ensures that imported vehicles, in spite of lower tariffs, remain 
much more expensive than Proton vehicles.176  The use of approval permits 
has been roundly criticized, even in Malaysia, as an opportunity for 
cronyism,177 a charge the Minister for Industry, Aziz, soundly denies.178 
The new policy was greeted with dismay by both Proton179 and non-
national car companies.180  Toyota threatened a pullout, and Nissan placed 
expansion plans on hold.181  Rather than lead to lower vehicle prices and 
therefore higher industry volumes, the industry braced itself for higher 
vehicle prices.182  By 2008, Malaysia may be forced to abandon the use of 
approval permits when certain provisions of the WTO agreement come into 
force.183 
In the meantime, serious in-fighting at Proton led to at least two 
attempts to displace Proton’s CEO, a protégé of former Prime Minister 
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Mahathir Mohammed.184  After a public war of words with the government 
wherein he complained that the government was not doing enough to protect 
Proton,185 he was forced out by Proton’s board in mid-2005.186  In light of 
these management problems at Proton, the government rushed to reassure 
the public that Proton’s performance in getting ready for AFTA 
liberalization would proceed on-course.187  Export plans, seen as critical to 
Proton’s survival, remained tentative.188  Most recently, the government has 
continued its push to prepare the domestic auto sector for increased 
liberalization and competition.189  The new Malaysian Prime Minister, 
Abdullah Badawi, has promised that protection for Proton will eventually 
end.190  By late 2005, the government was still fine-tuning the various 
instruments of trade policy at its disposal in an attempt to comply with its 
trade obligations while still helping Proton survive,191 including giving into 
pressure to phase out the controversial Approval Permit requirement.192 
Malaysia’s haltering entry into AFTA is emblematic of the 
problems AFTA has had generally.  In lowering tariff barriers as a result of 
AFTA, for example, Malaysia has also lowered tariffs for non-AFTA 
countries.  By doing so, cheap imports from South Korea have found a 
stronghold in Malaysia’s robust car market.  Indeed, in 2005, there were 
twenty-one vehicle models sold in Malaysia that were not part of AFTA.193  
If AFTA’s promise for the auto industry is to be realized, all vehicle markets 
should maintain common and high external tariffs to allow the ASEAN 
markets time to develop.194  Although this lesson appears lost on the 
Malaysians, they did agree to lower tariffs on CKD kits from Japan as part 
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of their 2005 free trade agreement with Japan..195 
IV. USING AICO TO TRADE CBU VEHICLES196 
As previously discussed, the implementing mechanism for AFTA is 
the CEPT Agreement.  As tariff lines move into the CEPT Inclusion List, 
their tariffs drop to zero to five percent.  The full implementation for AFTA 
was scheduled for January 1, 2003.  Prior to that date, it was possible for 
companies to use another mechanism, AICO, to obtain zero to five percent 
preferential tariff rates.  This section of the Article details how one 
automaker, Ford, used AICO to its advantage in 2002 in order to obtain 
duty-free privileges for complete vehicles one year ahead of AFTA’s 
implementation.197 
The AICO Agreement198 was signed by ASEAN member states in 
1996.199  The objectives of the Agreement were to promote increased 
ASEAN industrial production, closer ASEAN integration, increased 
investment, and increased industrial complementation.200  The most 
attractive feature of AICO was that, if granted, the company involved would 
receive a zero to five percent tariff rate ahead of AFTA implementation.201  
Member states were granted the authority to decide each AICO application 
individually.202  Although not mentioned specifically, AICO was targeted at 
the auto industry, and more specifically, at the Japanese automakers that 
already had established complementation networks.203  From its inception, 
AICO was fraught with difficulty for the industry, especially as each 
Member State was given complete discretion on the process for approving 
AICO applications.204  In 1997, there were only seven applications filed.205  
By 1999, forty-six applications had been filed, of which thirty-three 
involved manufacturing in Thailand.206  Of those thirty-three, twenty-eight 
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were from the auto industry.207 
The use of AICO to trade CBU vehicles, as opposed to parts, was 
unprecedented in 2002.208  In Ford’s estimation, the AICO would also bring 
intangible benefits along with the immediate tariff reductions.  At the time, 
automakers were nervous about AFTA’s viability for the auto industry.  
Malaysia had delayed implementation, and there was concern that the 
Philippines and Indonesia, which had much to lose in light of Thailand’s 
capability as an export hub, would also delay.209  The use of the AICO was 
therefore seen as a means of reassuring domestic assemblers and parts 
makers that AFTA, if fully implemented, would lead to success for all 
countries through the use of regional integration. 
Like most automakers, Ford’s strategy in the mid- to late-1990s was 
to regard each market in ASEAN as a separate emerging market poised for 
solid future growth.  This national market view led to the establishment of 
assembly plants in multiple locations throughout the region, specifically 
Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines.  By 1999, all four plants 
were producing identical vehicles.  Under a regional integration strategy, the 
plants would instead focus on making one or two products, and then trade 
the vehicles with other plants.210  Ideally, Malaysia would make the 
passenger car product since Malaysia was the biggest passenger car market 
in ASEAN.  The Thai affiliate would produce pickup trucks since Thailand 
was the biggest pickup market in ASEAN.  The Philippines would then 
produce the SUV product, as it was the newest plant and the Philippines had 
the lowest duty rates on parts from Japan and the United States (where the 
SUV was sourced from).  If Ford could realize these location-specific 
advantages, it would realize an AFTA strategy that would lead to greater 
volume, more consumer choice, and lower costs. 
Thus, in 2001, Ford filed an AICO application with the 
governments of Thailand and the Philippines for AICO privileges to apply 
to CBU vehicles.211  Under the AICO application, Ford proposed to move 
production of its passenger car from Thailand to the Philippines.212  It also 
sought to introduce a new SUV, the Ford Escape, by building it in the 
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Philippines and exporting it to Thailand.213  In return, Ford proposed ceasing 
production of its pickup truck in the Philippines, and importing the pickup 
truck, a new SUV product, as well as parts and components from its Thai 
affiliate.214  After running into some initial resistance,215 the AICO was 
approved by both governments,216 and Ford became the first automaker in 
the region to trade CBU vehicles at zero to five percent tariff rates.  In doing 
so, Ford also persuaded the Philippine government to adopt export 
incentives to encourage other automakers to export CBU vehicles from the 
Philippines.217 
Ford Philippines exported 10,000 CBU vehicles in 2004, and 
expects to export more than 14,000 in 2005.218  Exported vehicles include 
the Escape SUV and Focus sedan to Thailand and Indonesia.219  The AICO 
scheme’s relevance, in the meantime, has not diminished.  It can still be 
used by companies, for example, to realize preferential tariffs in countries 
such as Vietnam and Malaysia.  Toyota recently announced a study to use 
AICO to trade passenger and commercial vehicles between Thailand and 
Malaysia.220 
V. CURRENT INTEGRATION EFFORTS 
By 2005, most automakers in ASEAN were using the AFTA 
mechanisms to export from their base factories.  Ford, of course, was 
building on its AICO project to expand trade between its Thai and 
Philippine affiliates.  Nissan produces the Liberty multi-purpose vehicle in 
Thailand for export to Southeast Asia.221  It also produces the X-Trail 
compact SUV in Indonesia for export.222  German automaker BMW, on the 
other hand, has been slower to take advantage of AFTA.  It owns only one 
assembly plant in the region, in Rayong, Thailand.223  The company sold 
13,000 vehicles in ASEAN in 2004, but the Thai plant only manufactures 
for the Thai market, while local assemblers build vehicles for the Malaysian 
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and Indonesian markets.224  A trial run of exports from Thailand to 
Indonesia was successful, and the company has publicly stated its intent to 
use Thailand as a base to serve all of ASEAN.225  Even exporting in very 
small volumes can prove feasible within AFTA, as France’s Peugeot 
recently demonstrated with a shipment of twenty-four vehicles from its 
Indonesian subsidiary to Thailand.226  Peugeot also has plans to export 
vehicles from Malaysia.227  Of course, these vehicles must still satisfy 
AFTA’s forty percent local-content requirement to qualify for duty-free 
privileges, and it is hard to imagine a localization program for such small 
volumes. 
Toyota, which owns multiple plants throughout the region, has also 
started using AFTA to ship CBU vehicles between countries.  In 2004, 
Toyota began exporting its Avanza van product from its Indonesian affiliate 
to Malaysia in CKD form, and as a CBU vehicle to Thailand.228 
Tiny Suzuki has also started to use AFTA to take advantage of 
export opportunities.  In 2005, it began exporting its all purpose vehicle 
from Indonesia.229 
VI. INTEGRATING OUTSIDE ASEAN AND CLOSING THOUGHTS 
In the wake of collapsing global trade talks at the WTO, ASEAN 
appears determined to move forward with economic integration.  In 
November 2004, there were seventy-eight ongoing trade negotiations around 
the world, thirty within Asia, and a further twenty-two involving Asia.230  In 
the initial days of AFTA, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir warned that 
bilateral trade agreements may weaken AFTA by providing a “backdoor” 
for goods to enter an ASEAN member country and then be re-exported to 
other ASEAN member countries, exploiting the loose rules-of-origin to take 
advantage of preferential tariffs.231  His worst fears may be coming true.  
This integration is happening on both bilateral (between an ASEAN member 
country and a non-ASEAN country) and multilateral (between ASEAN 
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collectively and a non-ASEAN country) levels.  Multilateral discussions 
include China, India,232 Japan,233 South Korea, New Zealand, and 
Australia.234  Malaysia is negotiating free trade agreements with the United 
States and Japan, and has proposed bilateral agreements with Australia, 
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.235  Singapore has signed bilateral trading 
agreements with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United States.236  
Thailand has attempted bilateral trading agreement discussions with Japan, 
but progress proved rocky because of concerns of imported cars from Japan, 
while the sensitive topic of rice has been avoided altogether.237  Auto 
industry executives have warned that even an agreement to reduce tariffs on 
autos would result in a one-sided deal in favor of Japan, as the Japanese 
would implement non-tariff barriers to keep Thai exports from the market.238  
Japanese automakers promised to invest an additional $1 billion into 
Thailand if AFTA was signed.239  In late summer 2005, the governments 
announced a tentative deal.240  Indonesia has noticeably refrained from 
engaging in any discussions on bilateral trading agreements. 
As integration efforts proceed, opening a crack in the wall 
surrounding ASEAN, especially with regards to China, appears to pose 
some risks.241  Already, Chinese automaker Chery has announced plans to 
export vehicles from China to Malaysia and perhaps from there to other 
parts of Southeast Asia.242  Fellow automaker Geely has also announced 
plans to establish operations in Malaysia to take advantage of AFTA.243  
China’s role in this economic expansion causes the most angst among 
commentators.  The free trade area being contemplated between ASEAN 
and China appears to be a “half open model,” characterized by grossly 
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disproportionate advantages to China.244 
Commentators have observed that part of ASEAN’s problem is that 
for the more industrialized member states, their trading partners have always 
been non-ASEAN countries such as the United States, European Union, and 
Japan.245  This fact alone could lead AFTA to a state of forced irrelevance.246  
The experience of the auto industry in ASEAN, however, has demonstrated 
that AFTA has critical implications for the region.  Foreign direct 
investment in the auto industry in the region, for example, has exploded 
after the 2003 implementation of AFTA.247  Ironically, one of the most 
sensitive of the sectors that national governments have long sought to 
protect is also the sector with the strongest desire for AFTA integration.  
Product specialization and market cross-shipments demonstrate the clear 
benefits of AFTA to all stakeholders: governments, assemblers, suppliers, 
and customers.  The recent proliferation of free trade agreement negotiations 
poses an alarming risk to the development of a sustainable ASEAN 
economic community.  The lack of standards harmonization and distortive 
tax policies that suppress consumer demand further complicate the dream 
for a common market.  As ASEAN begins to look outwards for future trade 
ties, it may do well to remember these lessons. 
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